Structural adjustment and trade in Turkey: Investigating the alternatives "beyond export-led growth" by Yeldan, A.E.
Structural Adjustment and Trade in Turkey: 
Investigating the Alternatives "Beyond 
Export-led Growth'' 
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The article searches for a viable alternative for Turkey's economy to resolve its 
current confrontation with the dilemma of stabilization and growth. With the aid of 
a dynamic, computable, general equilibrium model, it is argued that an integrated, 
industrialization strategy that combines a domestic-demand-based, wage-goods-
oriented public investment program with a selective export-promotion scheme promises 
to be the most appropriate one serving Turkey's long-term industrialization interests. 
The model results further emphasize the pressing need for the revitalization of the 
domestic demand and the importance of the agricultural productivity growth in pro-
moting Turkey's overall objectives of industrialization, income equity, and foreign 
trade over the Fifth and Sixth Plan periods. 
1. INfRODUCTION 
After 20 years of planned inward-looking industrialization experi-
ence, Turkey sta11ed, with the introduction of a wide-ranging set of 
economic policies on January 24, 1980, to pursue an outward-oriented 
growth path centered around the dynamism of manufactured exports. 
Both the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank provided 
generous support to the Turkish adjustment efforts. Over the 1980-
1985 period, Turkey used SDR 1.5 billion from the IMF, in addition 
to the World Bank's U.S. $1.6 billion of "structural adjustment'"loans 
(SALs), which, in effect, has been one of the largest operations of its 
kind (Kopits 1987). 
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Stimulated mainiy by a vigorous export promotion strategy that 
consisted of high exp. lrt subsidies, competitive devaluations of the lira, 
and repressive attitu€les toward the domestic demand, Turkey suc-
ceeded in increasing the total value of its merchandise exports fourfold 
within the 1980-1985 period, averaging an increase of 25 percent per 
annum. This high export growth, however, was not achieved without 
costs, nor was it free of problems. Indeed, during the period, Turkish 
economy was observed to be beset with a variety of structural imbal-
ances and inconsistencies, which in tum gave rise to serious doubts 
about the limits to further export expansion, and the possibilities of 
future growth in manufacturing industries in general to sustain that 
expanston. 
First, despite all the conscious attempts and generous incentives 
toward the private sector to induce more ''privatization'' of the econ-
omy, private investments have been observed to be stagnant, and 
business conditions remained sluggish since the January 1980 Reform. 
Together with the overall inability of the political system to create 
public sector resources and investment, the domestic economy expe-
rienced a sharp drop in fixed capital investments and an increase in 
the rate of unemployment. Furthermore, there was an observed inl-
balance between the structure of exports (in favor of manufactured 
products) and the allocation of private investment funds (away from 
manufacturing industries), a phenomenon that was directly in conflict 
with the foundations of the overall growth strategy that rests on in-
creased manufactured exports (Yeldan 1987). Thus, in the post-Reform 
period, the decline in private investment and the increase in unem-
ployment seemed to be the two ''concomitants'' of the Turkish export 
promotion efforts (World Bank 1982). 
A third imbalance was yet to be found in the sectoral priorities that 
were severely biased against agriculture. Throughout the period 1981-
1985, agricultural output growth has been slow and erratic, and it 
became one of the main causes of the prolonged domestic inflation 
through the increases in food prices. 
Finally, ~;;: export promotion strategy wa£ also observed to be cou-
pled with a militant policy of repressing wage incomes, which led to 
an overall suppression of the domestic demand in the economy. Under 
conditions of slow growth, the repression of the domestic demand this 
way has been quite instrumental in generating a surplus that could be 
allocated to foreign markets via exports. However, contrasted with the 
historical importance of the domestic absorption capacity of the Turkish 
economy, export expansion by itself co:.ald not have produced sufficient 
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invigoration for economic growth, and the manufacturing industries 
continued to operate at subcapacity levels. 1 
Table 1 presents the main indicators of the Turkish economy under 
the period of structural adjustment. In retrospect, one can distinguish 
two subperiods from that table, based on the government's stance 
toward the rate of growth of public investment and that of aggregate 
gross domestic product (GOP) in general: First is the period 1980-
1984, in which, mainly due to the surge in export demand, growth in 
manufacturing has been quite high, but this performance does not seem 
to be shared by other sectors of the economy. Growth in agriculture 
is observed to be sluggish and erratic, and the construction sector 
remains virtually stagnant. It can be noted further that growth in ag-
gregate fixed investment has been slow, given the declining rate of 
growth of public investment, coupled with the hesitant recovery of 
private investment. These observations suggest that during this first 
subperiod, the sources of growth came not from the domestic economy 
but from outside via increased export demand. 
· In the subperiod 1985-1986, however, we observed a switch in the 
government's attitude towards more investment and rapid growth. 'fl-js 
phenomenon is especially pronounced for 1986, when-led by the 7. 7 
percent increase in agricultural output and a 11.6% increase in aggre-
gate fixed investment-- GOP grew by 7.1 percent. However, this rapid 
rate of growth could not ease the pressures of extremely high inflation 
rates coupled with high real interest rates, a very large public sector 
deficit, and an accumulating external debt burden, which mainly re-
sulted from the persistent current account deficits (note in particular 
the exhaustion of the engine of export growth in 1986). 
Thus, in the late 1980s, the Turkish government seems !o be con-
fronted with d1e t.rudc-vff oc!wee~ the objectives of stabilization and 
growth: In the cmo;ing decade, should Turkey continue with its ded-
ication to manufactured export-led growth devoting is resources for 
foreign markets? Or should it reevaluate its current repressive stance 
towards the domestic market and make attempts to reorient its industry 
toward establishing stronger links with the rest of the domestic econ-
omy in an environment of rapid growth? 
The analytical quest for the answer to this question constitutes the 
main motivation of this study. More specifically, the article calls for 
'According to TUSIAD's (1985, pp. 40-43) estimates, use of installed production capacity 
in private manufactu• i.,6 .;;;a could cot haw succeeded the 70 percent mark. 
~ 
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Table 1: Main Economic Indicators: Turkey 1979-1986 
1979 1980 1981 1981 1983 1984 1985 1986 
Real growth in 
Agriculture 2.8 1.7 0.1 6.4 -0.1 3.5 2.4 7.7 
Minir.g -16.3 -4.1 -7.3 -5.5 7.5 7.9 11.9 -1.8 
~.~w.;,;facture -5.3 -6.4 9.5 5.4 8.7 10.2 :;.5 10.2 
Construction 4.2 0.8 0.4 0.5 0.6 1.9 2.9 8.3 
Services 0.2 -0.2 3.7 3.5 3.9 5.3 4.0 6.1 
Gross domestic product (FC) -0.6 -1.0 3.6 4.5 3.9 5.8 4.2 7.1 
Fixed investment -3.6 -10.0 1.7 3.4 4.2 1.8 5.1 11.6 
Public 4.6 -3.7 10.2 2.2 3.2 -0.6 4.9 10.2 
Private -11.6 -17.3 -8.7 5.3 5.7 5.4 5.4 13.5 
Volume in millions U.S. $ 
Exports 2,261 2,910 4,703 5,746 5,728 7,133 7,958 7,583 
Imports 5,069 7,909 8,933 8,843 9,235 10,757 11,613 10,664 
Current Ace. Deficit 1,639 3,408 1,919 935 1,898 1,407 1,013 1,528 
Gross External Debt 15,800 19,000 19,200 19,700 20,300 22,000 25,800 31,800 
Wholesale prices" 63.8 107.2 36.8 25.2 30.6 52.0 44.0 28.0 
Index of reai wages b 
SII 144.9 100.0 93.2 93.9 93.1 86.9 
Ml 116.5 100.0 106.9 102.7 93.6 78.4 71.3 63.1 
Unempl .. Jyment rate 13.4 14.8 15.2 15.6 16.1 16.1 16.3 15.5 
Source: State Planning Organization Annual Programs; Treasury and Foreign Trade-External Debt Department. 
"Percent:1.ge change over previous year. > 
bBased on Consumer Price Index. The SII data are the average daily wages as reported by the Social Insurance Institute. The Ml (Manufacturing Industry) -< 
tl> 
Survey wage is calculated by dividing total payments by the number of workers engaged. Q: 
~ 
STRUCfURAL ADJUSTMENT AND TRADE IN TURKEY 277 
an assessment of the feasibility of manufactured, export-led growth as 
the major dynamic of developmen~ for the Turkish economy in the 
coming decade, which effectively covers the Fifth and the Sixth Five-
year Plan periods and attempts to design an economically viable al-
ternative development strategy. 
In this context, given the economic problems of the past decade and 
the realities of the domestic and international environments, it has to 
be recognized that a reversal to the previous inward-looking strategy 
of import-substitutionist industrialization is no longer feasible, nor is 
it desirable. Yet, it should be realized that the export-led development 
model alone does not exhaust the wide spectrum of "open" devel-
opment strategies. Indeed, in her own search for the alternative styles 
of development that are '"beyond export-led growth," Adelman (1984, 
p. 938) emphasizes the distinction between "an open development 
strategy, in which trade is an element of growth, and an export-led 
strategy in which trade is the major source of growth." 
Thus, this study starts with the major premise that the export-led 
model is not the only potentially promising alternative to the closed 
economy strategies of development and attempts to test the applicability 
of an alternative ''agricultural demand-led industrialization strategy as 
advocated by Adelman (1984) for South Korea. More explicitly, it is 
argued in this article that within the confines of an open trade regime, 
a reallocation of investment funds toward the agricultural sectors that 
serve the domestic market rather than the foreign markets may lead to 
outcomes superior to those of the export-led industrialization strategy. 
The arguments in favor of such a strategy would rest on the dynamic 
backward-forward linkages between the induced growth of the agri-
culture and the created mass market for the domestic industrial products 
that will be used as inputs in this process. Hence, effectively proposed 
is an "integrated" industrialization strategy, working through the 
agriculture-industry interlinkages by expanding the int~rnal demand 
for the intermediate and final (consumption) goods that are produced 
by the domestic manufacturing sectors. 2 
That growth of agriculture can be expected to stimulate industrial 
growth through a variety of mechanisms is well recognized and argued 
for in the development literature. These mechanisms include the fol-
lowing: ( 1) the release of an agricultural labor surplus to become a 
'The term integrated industrial strategy is due to Singer and Alizadeh (1986), who argue that 
in "the darkening external environmenl of the 1980's," a realistic option for LDCs is a trade 
regime consisting of a "synthesis'' of old import substitution wilh the more recent export 
orientation. 
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source of industrial employment (Jorgenson 1961; Ranis and Fei 1961; 
Lewis 1954) ; (2) the provision of cheaper food production and raw 
materials, and, hence, lower wage costs and intermediate good prices 
for tbe inputs used by the industry (Mellor 1976); (3) the generation 
of resource pulls through intermediate and final demand linkages for 
the products produced by the industry (Adelman 1984; Hayami and 
Ruttan, 1985; Hirschman 1981;) and (4) the provision of an investable 
surplus through the transfer of agricultural savings and rents (Adams 
1978; Mellor 1984; Chichilnisky and Taylor 1980). 
The proposed strategy is well suited to a middle-income, developing 
country like Turkey, with her established agricultural base and mass 
domestic market. Studies by Celasun ( 1983) and Nishimuzu and Ro-
binson (1984), for instance, conclude that domestic demand expansion 
has been the most important source of growth for Turkey in the postwar 
era. The call for such a strategy is especially timely for Turkey, which, 
in the early 1970s, had successfully completed the initial stages of 
industrialization, consisting of domestic production of consumer non-
durables and light intermediates (Pamuk 1984; World Bank 1982). 
Hence, the challenge for Turkey in the next decade is the establishment 
of the capital goods and the basic intermediate industries, and domestic 
production of the associated technologies. The advocated strategy, with 
its emphasis on the dynamic backward and forward interlinkages across 
sectors, seems to be the most appropriate strateg)' . serving Turkey's 
long-term industrialization interests. 
To test u'iis hypothesis analytically, the paper employs a dynamic 
micro-planning model that belongs to the class of price-endogenous 
constructs known as Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models. 
The model is composed of a simultaneous system of nonlinear equa-
tions that endogenously solve for the following: relative prices, sectoral 
production, wages, profits, the exchange rate, imports, exports, sec-
toral consumptiC>n and invest;:nent, and th~ functional distribution of 
IJlcome. 
The model, as applied to Turkey, distinguishes seven economic 
sectors, four types of labor, three consumer groups, seven social 
classes, and a government. In addition, it accommodates both fixed 
and flexible wages along with a disequilibrium mechanism of labor 
allocation, endogenous rural-urban migration, international trade flows 
with government intervention, and separate rules of allocation for the 
private-versus-public fixed investment. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: The next section 
describes the model and its distinguishing characteristics. The simu-
lation results are presented in the third section. The paper concludes 
with a general discussion in section four. 
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2. THEMODEL 
A Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model is a multisector, 
multiagent construct that is composed of a set of nonlinear. simulta-
neous equations that simulate the optimizing behavior of vavious eco-
nomic actors in response to various market signals. 
The model utilized in this study belongs to the class of CGE models 
th::~t incorporate the international economy as well as the domestic 
market into analysis. As a tribute to its dynamic characteristics, it is 
named TURK.f'LAN. Its theoretical foundations stem from the now 
classic works of Dervis et al. (1982) and of Adelman and Robinson 
(1978), and they borrow elements from the earlier CGE applications 
to Turkey, by Dervis and Robinson (1978), Lewis and Urata (1983), 
and Grais et al. (1984). 
Domestic output in each sector is given by a constant returns Cobb-
Douglas production tunction, with capital and aggregate labor as acting 
primary inputs. Intermediate inputs are assumed to be demanded in 
fixed proportions to the level of output. 
Labor input is offered in fixed supplies of four categories: Agricul-
tural labor is employed only in agriculture and is treated as immobile. 
However, between periods, rural-urban migration possibility is rec-
ognized in a Harris and Todaro ( 1970) specification in which rural 
labor moves to the urban sectors in response to differences between 
the agricultural and the expected urban wage rates. In the urban sectors, 
the organized/ skilled labor real wage rate is specified to be exogenously 
given. Following Dervis and Robinson ( 1978), the excess cf organized 
labor wage rate adjusts freely to clear the urban labor market. Finally, 
the service labor is employed primarily in the services sector and 
typifies the small-scale service enterprises, self-employed family labor, 
etc. 
On the trade side, the neoclassicai hypotheses of perfect substitut-
ability of tradables and the law of one price are dropped. Instead, 
following the common tradition of the previous CGE models, TURK-
PLAN adopts the Armingtonian composite commodity system, in 
which domestic goods and imports are imperfect substitutes and are 
aggregated in a CES function with a given elasticity of sub:::~itution. 
On the export side, domestic output is exhausted between exports and 
domestic consumption according to a Constant Elasticity of Transfor-
mation (CET) specification. 
In the simulation experiments, the exchange rate was held fixed, 
and an endogenous deficit on the balance of payments accounts was 
allowed to accumulate. 
The macro closure adopted for the model is neoclassical (savings 
280 A. Yeldan 
driven). Private households are assumed to save a fraction of their 
disposable income, given corresponding saving parameters. The gov-
ernment, on the other hand, is assumed to choose an exogenous fiscal 
ratio, expressing the desired level of public investment as a proportion 
of total GOP; given this ratio, it withdraws the necessary fraction of 
its total income as public savings, with public consumption being 
determined residually. 
Thus, modeled in this way. the savings pool of the economy sets 
the limits of investment demand, and of capital formation in general. 
The choice of this specification was based on the fact that it would 
give the maximum medium term sensitivity to balance of payments 
accounts and the foreign trade performance of the economy, the prime 
focus of this study. It also makes investment growth and capital ac-
cumulation maximally sensitive to the levels of per capita income and 
changes in income distribution. The system of equations in algebraic 
fonn is available from the author upon request. 
3. SEARCHING FOR THE ALTERNATIVES 
In this section, we utilize the CGE model as a planning device in 
order to analyze the expected behavior of the economy under the 
guidance of alternative development strategies. 
As was noted in the introduction, during the 1980-1984 period 
Turkish policymakers tried to lay the foundations of a development 
strategy that found its dynamic in increased manufactured exports and 
in the overall reallocation of domestic resources away from agriculture 
and toward industry. The Fifth Five-Year Development Plan (FFYP) 
which, in fact, was drafted in 1983 and put into effect in 1985, can 
be regarded as the government's most important instrument in attaining 
its trade objectives for the next decade. Our first policy experiment, 
then, is inspired by the Fifth Plan's policy stand, and it mainly simulates 
a growth path of the economy in which direct export subsidies to 
manufacturing and the reallocation of public investment away from 
agriculture to industry are the two main characteristics. This first ex-
periment is named Manufacturing Export-Led Industrialization (MXLI) 
and is described in detail below. 
As an alternative to MXLI, the simulation of a domestic-demand-
and-wage-goods-oriented development strategy constitutes the second 
policy experiment that is to be tested in TURKPLAN. Following Adel-
man's seminal ( 1984) work, it will be referred to as ''agricultural 
demand-led industrialization"-or in its better-known shorthand ac-
ronym, "ADLI. "-strategy. I now tum to a detailed description of 
the two experiments. 
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The MXLI strategy is simulated by subsidizing manufacturing ex-
ports by 12 percent (the average subsidy rate for manufacturing in 
1985) through the remaining 4 years of the Fifth Plan (1986-1989), 
and by 6 percent during the Sixth Plan period, with no subsidy being 
granted to agricultural exports. All subsidy rates are provided on an 
ad valorem basis and are directly paid out of the government's budget. 
Also, to eliminate the tariff-induced bias against exports, the tariff 
rates are decreased gradually from their 1985 levels, to be abolished 
completely in 1990. 
To further reflect the positive bias towards export-oriented manu-
factures, the public invesbnent shares of these sectors are increased at 
the expense of agriculture. More specifically, agriculture's share of 
the public invesbnent fund is set at 8 percent, whereas the manufac-
turing sectors are allocated a sum of 43 percent (both figures are the 
official Fifth Plan estimates). 
Finally, in order to account for the repressive policies toward labor, 
frequently associated with the orthodox export-oriented policy pack-
ages, the rate of growth of the organized labor wage rate is assumed 
to be only half of the rate observed under the alternative ADLI strategy. 
As an alternative to MXLI, the ADLI strategy is implemented by 
shifting the invesbnent structure toward agriculture and those sectors 
that have strong backward and forward linkages with agriculture, i.e., 
intermediates and machinery. Private investment behavior, on the other 
hand, is allowed to be determined endogenously, responding to sectoral 
deviations from the economywide average rate of return to capital, as 
is also the case under the MXLI experiment. Retention of this neo-
classical property allows the model to move toward an intertemporal, 
steady-state equilibrium in which all profit rates are equilized across 
sectors. 
It is assumed that the increase in agricultural investment will allow 
the factor productivity of agriculture to grow at a rate twice that of 
the one assumed to be achieved und~r the MXLI strategy (2.5 percent 
versus 1.2 percent during 1986-1989, and 2 percent versus 1 percent 
during 1990-1994). Given the prolonged neglect of the Turkish ag-
riculture, which has especially reached to severe proportions during 
the 1980s, and given its vast potential of unexploited resources, the 
assumed ADLI rates of agricultural tech;ncal productivity growth 
should be considered modest. In fllct, the above assumed technological 
progres~ r2tes are 20 percent below the rates hypothesized by Adelman 
(p. 941) in her simulations for Korea, where she has taken the average 
productivity growth rate of all developing countries during the 1970s 
as her estimate of the technical progress rate achievable under ADLI 
during the next decade. 
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With respect to foreign trade, direct export subsidies are equalized 
and tied to a timetable, which gradually reduces and abolishes all t:xport 
subsidies by 1989, the last year of the FFYP. Furthermore, all tariff 
rates are reduced to 10 percent and equalized across all sectors, so as 
to remove the antiagricu!ture bias associated with having a differential 
system of incentives that t~rant higher levels of protection to industry. 
The simplification and rationalization of the Turkish system of trade 
incentives is in fact one of the main recommendations of the World 
Bank's 1982 Balassa mission, which has concluded that the system of 
protection in Turkey has traditionally discriminated against agriculture, 
with protection rates lower than industry on the average of 28 percent. 
Similar conclusions have been reached by the Yagd ( 1984) and Milano-
vic (1986) studies as well, where the authors repeatedly stressed the 
need for the gradual narrowing and eventual elimination of the wide 
variation in protection rates. In particular, Milanovic (p. 75) argued 
that the Turkish export encouragement scheme for the 1980- i 984 
period was not uniform toward all sectors nor toward all producers, 
and that "it consistently favored producers of capital goods over con-
sumer and intermediate goods industries and, in addition, gave special 
incentives to large exporters.'' 
If we tum back to the macro side, the model's closure rule requires 
that tht: government investment/GOP ratio be specified exogenously. 
To assume comparability among the model-runs, this ratio has been 
fixed at the path projected by the Fifth Plan (except for the third 
experiment, yet to be described below). The Plan projects for a slow-
paced rise in the ratio of public investment to the GOP, which is 
predicted to stabilize around 11.6 percent by 1990. Assuming that this 
particular ratio reve~ls the Turkish authorities' desired rate of public 
investment in the medium run, the government's investment fund is 
kept at 11.6 percent of the nominal GOP for the entire Sixth Plan 
period as well. Furthermore, again to assure comparability, the nominal 
exchange rate is adjusted each year so as to offset any differential 
between the domestic and the world inflation rates. 
Finally, as was also mentioned under the discussion of the MXLI 
experiment, the ADLI rate of growth of the organized labor-real-wage 
rate is assumed to be 50 percent higher than the one envisaged for the 
MXLI. This assumption, in part, reflects the expected salient character 
ADLI toward labor as well as its democratic orientation. However, 
these assumed political attributes should not be taken as the identifying 
institutional characteris:ics of the above distinguished experimental 
economic regimes. Certainly, one can count numerous other factors 
in addition to government's sectoral priorities in investment and ~rade 
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that may affct the evolution of the Turkish sociopolitical structure in 
the next decade, a full investigation of which is surely beyond the 
scope of this article. What needs to be stressed here is the wages-
goods orientation of the ADLI strategy, which calls for building a 
strong domestic, mass-consumption market that puts primary emphasis 
on the satisfaction of the domestic wants. And it is this particular 
nature of ADLI that is likely to raise the factor renumerations of 
workers, in order to generate the foundations of the strong domestic 
"mass-consumption market." The MXLI, on the other hand, seeks 
its source of demand in foreign markets and tends to observe the wage 
bill only as a "cost item"; hence, the need for suppressing the real 
wages. 
We now tum to the analysis of the experiment results. As can be 
seen in Table 2, on the basis of domestic macro performance, ADLI's 
results fare substantially better than those of the MXLI. Both the real 
GDP and real consumption have consistently higher growth rates under 
the ADLI experiment. Mainly as a result of the faster economic growth, 
real private savings and capital accumulation are higher with the ADLI 
strategy as well. Furthermore, we observe that the higher growth of 
the organized labor real wage rate does not strain the ADLI economy; 
on the contrary, more labor is abie to find employment at the higher 
organized labor-wage rate. This suggests that in the ADLI economy, 
labor productivity rises faster, and, in effect, this "permits" the man-
ufacturing real wages to grow at a rate higher than the one observed 
in the MXLI economy. 
A closer look at the growth rates of the real manufacturing wages 
further illustrates this point. In addition to the slower rate of growth 
of the organized real wage rate, both the unskilled and the service 
labor categories experience lagging wage incomes under MXLI ex-
periment. In fact, with MXLI, the unskilled labor-real-wage rate av-
erages minus 0.3 percent per annum. This comes on top of the observed 
severe decline in the manufacturing wages during the 1980-1985 pe-
riod. Clearly, the MXLI strategy continu~s to impose a very harsh 
pressure on urban real wages, and it raises doubts about whether it 
would be possible to restrict the rate of growth of those wages to a 
very slow--or even to a declining- growth path throughout the whole 
15-year period. 
On the mral side, however, the MXLI results indicate that the rate 
of growth of the agricultural real wage is more rapid than its counterpart 
under ADLI. This result, of course, comes as no surprise, especially 
when it is considered in relation to the movements of the agricultural 
terms of trade across the two experiments. Under the MXLI experi-
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Table 2: Experiment Results 
MXLI ADLI ADLI·SEL 
Results in final year (1994) 
Real gross domestic product (GDP)Q 11412.5 12787.8 12530.2 
Real private consumptionb 8041.4 8771.7 8574.4 
Real private savingsb 1038 5 1194.1 1148.2 
Aggregate real investment' 3010.1 3505.2 3243.6 
Average profit rate (%) 24.' 21.7 21.6 
Organized labor employmentd 3390.7 3688.4 3435.4 
Agricultural terms of trade' 128.9 95.5 94.9 
Merchandise exports~ 19.8 17.4 18.5 
Merchandise imports' 25.5 26.1 24.3 
Balance of payments deficit'" -0.4 3.0 -0.1 
Growth rat<:s to final year (Annual percent) 
Agriculture 3.7 6.2 6.2 
Food processing 3.9 5.6 5.6 
Textiles, clothing 10.1 6.6 6.7 
lntennediates 7.2 7.5 7.6 
Machinery 8.2 8.9 8.5 
Social overhead 6.5 7.7 7.1 
Services 5.5 5.5 5.3 
Real GOP 4.9 6.2 6.0 
Real private consumption 4.5 5.5 5.3 
Aggregate real investment 7.3 9.1 8.2 
Merchandise exports (nominal) 11.5 10.0 10.7 
Merchandise imports (nominal) 9.5 9.7 8.9 
Growth rates of real wages (annual percent) 
Rural labor 3.4 2.9 2.8 
Organized labor 2.0 3.0 3.5 
Unskilled labor -0.3 1.1 0.5 
Service labor 2.7 4.0 3.8 
Index of real absorption in 1994 ( 1985 = 100) 
Agriculture 142.5 171.3 169.9 
Food processing 143.8 163.3 160.0 
Textiles, clothing 209.6 180.7 176.0 
lntennediates 177.9 185.2 181.8 
Machinery 183.0 195.9 183.4 
Social overhead 176.8 195.3 186.1 
Services 164.7 165.8 162.1 
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'fable 2 (continued) 
MXLI 
Index of physical capital stocks in 1994 (1985 = 100) 
Agriculture 162.8 
Food procel!'sing 264.4 
Textiles, clotlling 335.8 
Intennediates 149.6 
~achine~ 269.4 
Social overhead 146.5 
Services 120.4 
DVaJued at market prices, 1981 base. 
6Deflated by CPI, 1981 base. 
<Deflated by the Capital Price Index, 1981 base. 


















'Ratio of the agricultural to the nonagricultural sectors' producer prices (198S = I 00) 
'Current billion U.S. $. 
ment, the agricultural tenns of trade index reaches to 128.9 (with 1985 
= 100), whereas with ADLI, it registers a slight fall (to 95.5). 
This reveals that, under ADLI, if one takes both price and income 
effects into account, the rate of increase in agncultural productivity is 
faster than the rate of increase in agricultural prices. In the absence of 
any negating market restrictions, the relative abundance of the agri-
cultural good exerts downward pressure in its price and relatively 
reduces the rate of growth of farmers' incomes. Yet, strictly speaking, 
occurrence of this phenomenon may run counter to the objecti·les of 
the ADLI strategy, which puts primary emphasij.s on the dynamic rural-
industrial demand linkages. This point, in fact, is strongly stressed in 
Adelman (p. 945), who argues that "the appropriate dynamic incen-
tives (which this policy aims at fostering) will not materialize if shifts 
in domestic tenns of trade against agriculture are allowed to negate 
the income benefits of productivity improvement," and that "a con-
tinued stream of technological improvements can only be expectd from 
farmers if they experience continuing improvements in their incomes.'' 
What is needed-along with the productivity-improving effects of the 
ADLI strategy-then, is a "tenns of trade policy" that will ~arantee 
that the fruits of the increased agricultural productivity will be ~qually 
shared by both fanners and the urban consumers. 
The elements of this policy are plentiful and do not necessarily l·all 
for the government's regulation of agricultural prices through pri.~e 
floors, etc. However, they certainly include the elimination of the 
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biased trade polici~s that distort incentives against agriculture and 
impose implicit taxes on agricultural exports. The asymetric treatment 
of agriculture, which is often implicit in many developing nations' 
trade regimes, causes agriculture to seem relatively less profitable, 
with the end result that economic resources are diverted away from 
that sector to heavy industries, where domestic resource costs are high 
and dynamic linkages with the rest of the economy are limited. Inter-
national trade policy, therefore, should constitute an important part of 
any policy package, the prime objective of which is to improve rural 
incomes. Adelman, in fact, recognizes this point and states that it is 
possible to implement the tenus of trade policy ". . . indirectly 
through international trade rather than through price control and sub-
sidies (by) following an open-economy policy of letting the world 
market prices set the internal terms of trade" (p. 945). The ADLI 
strategy, by imr.!Osing a uniform tariff rate of merchandise imports, 
does not discriminate against any sector and allows both a{:riculture 
and industry to eJt:ploit their full economic potential. 
As a matter of fact, the simulation results indicate that after 10 years 
of the ADLI exp~rience, the relative lag in thP. rural incomes, as 
compared to the MXLI alternative, ir. modest indeed. Also, compared 
with the MXLI resuits, one can see that the difference in the rural 
incomes between the two experiments is much smaller than the ob-
served difference in the urban incomes. One factor that explains this 
outcome is the migration possi.bilities recognized in the model. Rural 
migration, as attracted by the differential in the agricultural and the 
average urban wage rates, releases most of the pressures on agricultural 
labor that are imposed by the falling output prices. 
Thus, the experiment results suggest that, given the migratory pos-
sibilities, negative terms of trade effects of the ADLI strategy are not 
likely to be severe. In principle, they be counterweighed by appropriate 
social policies that are designed to improve the material welfare of 
farmers, such as more investment in human capital, improved edu-
cation, and better health facilities. 
A case can also be made for dispersing the industrial activities more 
evenly (in the geographical sense) by making the industrial capital 
more mobile across regions. This policy option, in fact is strongly 
advocated by Schuh (1976), who states that policies that aim at more 
decentralization of the industrial activities would result in ''more ef-
ficient factor markets serving agriculture, (which) in tum, would serve 
for a reduction in the disparity in per capita incomes between the 
agricultural and non-agricultural sectors" (p. 57). 
Such a policy would also induce ''a more optimal rate of investment 
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in human capital (by increasing) the rate of return on investment in 
agricultural research and extension (and by allowing) ... the rural com-
munities to capture the returns to such investment" (pp. 56-57). 
If we tum our attention to the international trade, we observe that 
the overall performance of ADU is not as strong and convincing as 
in the previous macro indicators. The average rate of growth of the 
nominal value of merchandise exports cannot exceed the 10 percent 
mark and poorly contrasts with MXLI's average rate of 11.5 percent. 
The BOP deficit, if valued in domestic currency, comprises about 9.5 
percent of the total savings generated in the ADLI economy and raises 
serious doubts about the feasibility of the favorable results achieved 
in other macro categories. Thus, if we conceptualize the behavior of 
the Turkish economy of the period 1985-1986 as a crude portrayal of 
an ADLI-oriented strategy, the model results indicate that reliance on 
such a strategy is likely to allow the domestic economy to reach its 
historical growth rate of 6-7 percent, with increased capital accumu-
lation and higher private incomes. However, in tenns of self-reliance 
and economic dependence, its prospects are very gloomy, as the econ-
omy still remains dependent on foreign borrowing and on the exoge-
nous flows of workers' remittances. 
Thus, the overall conclusion that emerges from the model results is 
clear: If Turkey attempts to solve her balance of payments problems 
solely through a foreign trade policy of heavy export subsidies, coupled 
with a persistent emphasis on manufacturing orientation that does not 
take into account the dynamic agriculture-industry interlinka3es or the 
needs of the domestic markets, the end result will be a slow-growing 
economy, with suppressed wage-incomes and a hesitant domestic de-
mand recovery. On the other hand, a primarily domestic demand-
oriented, wage-goods strategy that focuses exclusively on developing 
the domestic production network of sectoral interlinkages seems to 
achieve the objectives of more rapid growth, higher per capita income~, 
and rationalization of the economic structure. Yet it fails to create a 
self-reliant economy that will not be constrained by the availability of 
foreign funds. 
The best strategy, therefore, is a mixed one, which entails the pos-
itive elements of both of the previous two alternatives but attempts to 
minimize on their adverse consequences. More specifically, what is 
required is an economically viable alternative that ( 1) is capable of 
generating sufficiently high-economic growth and of raising the rate 
of investment, (2) gives sufficient emphasis to the needs of the domestic 
demands as well as the domestic savings, (3) recognizes the need for 
achieving a more rational production structure where intermediate and 
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final demand linkages across sectors are taken into account and none 
of the sectors is discriminated, and (4) is capable of generating suf-
ficient export revenues so that it will not likely be hampered by the 
binding foreign exchange constraints. 
In order to test the feasibility of such an alternative, a third exper-
iment has been conducted that, in effect, attempts to blend the ADLI 
strategy with a selective export promotion policy. This experiment is 
to be referred as the "Selective ADLI Strategy," or "ADLI-SEL" in 
short. In addition to the policies of the simple ADLI strategy described 
above, it imposes the following: 
1. For the Intermediates and the Machinery sectors, instead of grad-
ually eliminating the direct export subsidies by 1990, hold them 
at their 1986 levels throughout the FFYP period (1986-1989), 
and then start decreasing them gradually and abolish altogether 
by 1994. 
2. Continue to follow a constant PLD real exchange rate policy 
throughout the FFYP; however, for the Sixth Plan period, let the 
parity slide down by devaluing the PLD real exchange rate by 
an average of 5 percent per annum. 
3. To compensate for the expected loss in foreign savings because 
of attempts towards eliminating the Balance of Payments deficit, 
increase the government investmer..! fund, bringing its nominal 
value to 14 percent of the GDP throughout the whole experiment 
period. 
4. In order to finance government's investment requirements and to 
allow noninflationary implementation of these policies, increase 
household income tax rates-by 1 percent for the rural and worker 
households, and by 1.5 percent for the capitalist households. 
5. Increase the rate of growth of the organized labor's real wage 
rate to an average of 3.5 percent over the whole experiment 
period (1.5 percent higher than the rate assumed for MXLI) to 
allow for the increased productivity of that labor category. 
Thus, ADLI-SEL recognizes the Intermediates and the Machinery 
sectors as the "infant-export industries" and provides additional (yet 
quite modest) export incentives through the Fifth Plan period by holding 
their direct export subsidy rates at their 1986level (10 percent), when, 
for the other sectors, the subsidies are in the process of elimination. 
As for the Sixth Plan period, the granted export subsidies are tied to 
a timetable that gradually diminishes their rates to nill by the end of 
the experiment period. What is implemented with this policy is, there-
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fore, a typical "infant industries" program that grants certain addi-
tional incentives to selected sectors for a predetermined period of time, 
at the end of which the selective treatment will be eliminated. The 
suggestion to follow an infant manufactured-exports program has, in 
fact, been advocated in the previous CGE modeling study by Dervis 
and Robinson (1978) and ,uso by Boratav (1984a). It is hoped, with 
the implementation of such a program, that the traditional light-man-
ufacturing and primary exports orientation of the Turkish economy 
win be redirected toward more complex industries that, in the mean 
time, will be able to utilize their potential economies of scale and 
"deepen" the industrialization process. 
The World Bank's 1982 Balassa mission to Turkey lends support 
to this argument as well, in stating that Turkey's comparative advantage 
is to be found neither in the most simple labor-intensive goods nor 
in the most capital-intensive products. Rather, "it lies in the large 
range of goods between the two extremes, and increasingly skill-
intensive products"; aiso, "in the longer term, Turkey's comparative 
advantage will increasingly lie in electrical and non-electrical machin-
ery, machine tools, and electronics" (World Bank, 1982, p. 22). 
The third column in Tallie 1 presents the main economic indicators 
of the ADLI-SEL experiment. As can be observed, average rates of 
growth of real GOP, real private consumption, and real aggregate 
investment are slightly below the rates achieved under ADLI but still 
substantially higher than those of the MXLI. The slowdown of the 
engine of economic growth relative to ADLI is mainly due to the loss 
of extra foreign resources injected to the domestic economy by way 
of deficits in the balance of payrr;ents. Even so, capital accumulation 
remains remarkably high tltanks to the increased rate of growth of real 
government investment. 
With respect to foreign trade, we see that ADLI-SEL's results remain 
favorable. Nominal exports rise by an annual average rate of 10.7 
percent, and, although they are below the rate achieved by the MXLI, 
they suffice to close the balance of payments deficit by reaching a 
modest surplus of U.S. $0.1 billion in 1996. 
A further macro-level comparison of the three experiments can be 
made using the results· from the factor markets. Such a comparison 
indicates that the real wage growth rates of the ADLI-SEL economy 
follow a similar path as the one under the ADLI economy. As a matter 
of fac.i., under ADLI-SEL, the rate of growth of the averag~.: nominal 
manufacturing wage rate reaches 21.8 percent per annum-the highest 
of the three experiments. This affirms that the internal logic of the 
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ADLI-SEL rate of growth and export perfomance does not rely on 
suppressed wage demands that restrain the domestic demand on the 
otherwise exportable output, as was in the case of the MXLI stategy. 
As a final inference from Table l, we also observe that the rate of 
growth of the industrial capital stock is more rapid under ADLI-SEL, 
indicating that the linkage effects are working. Indeed, in the MXLI 
experiment, Food Processing and Textiles are the only manufacturing 
sectors that achieve higher physical capital stock indexes. Generally 
speaking, the heavy export emphasis of the MXLI strategy seems to 
be capitalized by the "export-oriented," light-manufactures such as 
food, textiles, clothing and leather, which, on the basis of their tra-
ditional comparative advantage, expand rapidly, and, along with Ag-
riculture, exhaust the investable resources of the private savings pool. 
ADLI-SEL on the other hand, achieves what MXLI fails to do with 
respect to heaving manufacturing, by generating strong domestic de-
mand pulls for those sectors, as well as by an energetic public in-
vestment program that emphasizes accumulation of capital in key 
linkage industries. 
The foregoing discussion of the model runs suggests that, coupling 
a proper export incentives program with a public investment strategy 
that seeks a balance between the wage-goods and the capital goods 
industries, Turkey can attain her export targets without causing undue 
strain on her domestic markets. The elements of this strategy also 
include an income distribution and a social welfare policy geared to-
wards the improvement of material wellbeing of rural people in order 
to combat the pressures of the likely negative terms of trade on their 
mcomes. 
We have further seen that government's sectoral investment deci-
sions play a key role throughout the whole process in generating the 
crucial intemediate input demand p'Jlls for the capital-investment pro-
ducing sectors. The next section brings together the distinguishing 
elements of the alternative strategy of growth and further attempts to 
deduce some policy conclusions for other middle-income developing 
countries. 
4. DISCUSSION 
4.1 Elements of the New Strategy of Growtb 
The above analysis clearly indicated the importance of the vitali-
zation of the domestic demand and also the key role that could be 
played by the domestic agriculture in promoting the industrialization 
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objectives of Turkey in the coming decade. The forward runs of the 
model suggested that by combining a selective export promotion pro-
gram with a domestic demand-oriented, wage-goods strategy, which 
focuses primarily on the development of the domestic production net-
work of sectoral interlinkages, Turkey ca., achieve a superior growth 
performance over the current strategy of manufactured, export-led 
industrialization . 
In general, the superiority of a rural-development led, wage-goods-
oriented industrialization strategy seems to rest on the following three 
distinguishing advantages: ( 1) expansionary increases in the national 
income through technological change in agriculture, along with its 
consequent multiplier effects on manufacturing growth through the 
dynamic intersectoral resource pulls; (2) a change in the level and 
structure of domestic production, which can be manipulated to satisfy 
a higher level of domestic absorption via increases in wage-goods; and 
(3) induced shifts in the relative demand for factors of production in 
favor of labor through increases in labor productivity. 
The income distribution consequences of the new strategy will be 
complex. Generally speaking, based on the model solutions with re-
spect to the functional distribution of income, the new strategy of 
growth is likely to increase markedly the relative incomes of the poor 
and of the urban laboring classes. This, after all, will be the logical 
outcome of a wage-goods-oriented strategy of development that is 
based on the expansion of the domestic market. With respect to the 
rural labor, on the other hand, the progressive distributionary effects 
of the alternative strateg} will depend on :tow fast the productivity 
increases in agriculture can be translated into higher material incomes 
through movements in the domestk terms of trade. However, the matter 
is not only pricing issue. The government's social policies towards 
human capital buildup in rural areas, by way of massive 'rublic in-
vestments in health, education, transportation, and electrification, will 
also be equally important in improving the material welfare of the rural 
poor. This second point is, of course, a part of the social welfare 
objective, but it is equall:' part of the industrial growth strategy, in 
that it would mean additio ·al effective demand for the products pro-
duced by the domestic indttstry. 
The technology adaptation aspects of the proposed strategy are likely 
to have favorable effects for the rural poor as well. As Hayami and 
Ruttan (1985) painstakingly point out, agricultural "bio-technology," 
in contrast to ''mechanical technology,'' is scale neutral and divisible, 
thus making it possible for the small-/medium-size farmers to have 
easy ar:cess to such technology. Furthermore, there is strong evidence 
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in the economic literature that small-/medium-size fanners use mostly 
labor intensive methods of production, are very responsive to produc-
tion incentives, and tend to invest heavily in human capital fonnation. 3 
In the Turkish rural socioeconomic structure, in which small peasantry 
is observed to be the dominant mode of production,4 tht:se hypotheses 
will be more likely to translate into higher adaptability and increased 
labor employment in agriculture. 
Overall, then, the following distinguishing elements of the new 
strategy could be identified: 
I. First, priority should be given to increasing agricultural production 
and securing the domestic network of sectoral linkages through a care-
ful public investment program. 
2. Based on the expected fact that the new investments will neces-
sitate increases in capital imports, a realistic and comprehensive set 
of commerical policies would have to be enacted. A realistic foreign-
exchange policy of currency depreciation along with a selective, time-
wise, regressive export promotion scheme can be regarded as being 
the two most important components of the new trade regime. The 
proposed export promotion scheme is selective and is tied to a time 
schedule, and it is thought to be directed toward the basic intennediates 
and machine-tool industries, through which Turkey would be able to 
develop and exploit her comparative advantage, and in the meantime 
would be least likely to face protectionist measures in the foreign 
markets. In this context, a further case can also be made in favor of 
an across-the-board scheme of tariff protection, along with a discrim-
inatory policy of domestic taxation to tap the demand for luxury im-
ports, and to provide additional resources for the government budget 
in order to allow for the antiinftationary implementation of its invest-
ment policies. 
3. In order to counter the likely negative effects of the falling do-
mestic tenns of prices against agriculture, a social welfare program of 
rural development through expanded investments in human capital 
should be enacted. 
4. Based on the fact that agricultural development-by its nature of 
small-scale production units and the overall irregularity of the pro-
duction process-requires a considerably decentralized administrative 
'See, e.g., the World Bank (1982) World Development Report. New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
•see. e.g., Keyder (1983). Boratav (1983. chap. 2), or Tutengil (1983). For a recent review 
of the Turkish agriculture and its rural class structure from a political point of view, see Seddon 
and Marguiles (1984). 
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structure (Mellor 1976), more participatory forms of government and 
decision making should be encouraged. 
In a nutshell, then, the proposed strategy entails elements of an 
industrialization program, an employment program, an income distri-
bution program, and a social community development program. Fur-
thermore, because of its underlying economic and social structures, 
the new strategy of growth is expected to inherently allow (or rather 
to warrant) more participatory forms of government, a fact mat would 
be very conducive in speeding up the democratizatio-r. process of the 
civil political life in Turkey. 
4.2 Policy Implications of the New Strategy for the 
Developing Countries 
Overall, a wag.;:>goods-oriented, agriculture-linked manufacturing 
growth strategy appears to be most promising for those developing 
countries that have a potentially large domestic market and a proven 
responsive agriculture, along with an established physical infrastructure 
and industrial base. As Adelman (1984, p. 948) attests, this would 
mean most of the middle-income and the large low-income countries, 
which have not already reached the NICs' status of proven export 
potential, or those that are not anticipating a sufficient rapid growth 
in the world demand for their nontraditional exports. 
In fact, the observed stagnation of the volume of world trade in the 
first half of the 1980s and the rising tide of the protectionist sentiment 
in the developed market economies have already led a number of 
scholars to call for a reassessment of the feasibility of export-led growth 
as the major development dynamic for most LDCs in the coming decade 
(e.g., Cline 1982; Kaplinsky 1985; Sampson 1980; Streeten 1982). 
It has to be noted in this context that, although this article shares 
most of the elements of the growing disenchantment in the economic 
literature toward the viability of an export-led growth strategy for most 
LDCs in the next decade, its main propositions do not necessarily 
hinge upoll any kind of an empirically questionable argument based 
on export pessimism. Rather, as stated in the introductory pages, the 
underlying motivation of this study has been based on the observation 
that as there are inefficient strategies of import-substitutionist growth, 
there can also be inefficient styles of the export-oriented development 
strategy. Surely, the empirical debate on whether the Turkish economy, 
or the developing countries in general, will be able to sustain rapid 
rates of export growth in the immediate future is very important in 
every aspect of the new development strategy, but the point is that its 
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economic rationale is not conditional upon a negative attitude toward 
the future export potentials of the LDCs. 
This beings us to yet another parable of this study, and it is the 
basic argument that there is no such eternal strategy that can be valid 
for all countries at all times. In the Turkish context, for instance, it 
was observed that the early import·substitutionist strategy was quite 
conducive in giving an original stimulus to the Turkish industry during 
the 1960s. However, this initial momentum was quickly exploited by 
the late 1970s, and that strategy has failed in its planned targets. The 
1980s strategy of manufactured·export·led growth, on the other hand, 
has been instrumental in increasing merchandise exports and also 
changing their composition in favor of the manufacturing industries. 
Yet it could not provide sufficient invigoration to the domestic economy 
and raised serious concerns over the next decade if/when the export 
potential of the export promotion scheme has reached its limits. As 
we have seen in section three, over the medium run, the model runs 
clearly suggest the superiority of a domestic demand-based industrial· 
ization strategy that is primarily oriented toward the production of 
wage-goods and toward the simultaneous expansion of the intennediate 
indl.lstries and the overall absorption capacity of the domestic economy. 
The relevance and applicability of this conclusion to the other 
middle-income developing countries depend, of course, on the specific 
structural conditions of those indigenous economies and also on the 
changing economic and political conditions of the global international 
environment. 5 In the meantime, however, it is important to emphasize 
that potentially viable alternatives to export-led growth do exist, and 
many developing countries are likely to benefit from a careful re-
evaluation of their arsenal of alternative policy options in the 1990s. 
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